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NLRB BACK PAY AS A PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERPRETATION UNDER THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT*

Michael Fooner t

F

OR several years the question whether NLRB back pay should be
deemed "wages" under various administrative aspects of the Social
Security Act 1 has been a recurring issue. It is one which is periodically
tried in the administrative offices of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
of the Social Security Board, and of the various state unemployment
compensation commissions. As far as this writer has been able to determine, the question h~s been taken to the courts in only <?ne instance,
the New Yark Supreme Court, on appeal from decision of the
unemployment insurance administrative and appeal agencies of that
state.2 The court held that back pay is "wages," but this decision has
not been recognized as generally determinative.
Ordinarily the question occurs in connection with an individual
claim for unemployment benefits ( under a state unemployment compensation system), or for a federal social insurance pension (under the
old-age and . survivors insurance system). From time to time, labor
organizations have raised the issue in order to gain "wage credits" for
groups of their members. At still other times employers have raised
the issue in order to gain exemption from tax levies. 3
The ultimate solution to the problem is important to the thousands
of workers and their families who have present and future benefit

* Any opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily express the
official attitude of the Social Security Board.
Formerly associate administrative analyst, Social Security Board; now economist
with the War Production Board. M.A., University of Wisconsin; author of various
articles on social security.-£/.
1 49 Stat. L. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S. C. (1940), § 401 et seq.
2 In re Tonra, 258 App. Div. 835, 15 N. Y. S. {2d) 755 (1939). See discussion
following, pp. 69-70.
3 The benefit features of the old-age and survivors insurance system are set forth
in Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. (1940), § 402; the taxing features
of. this program are set forth in the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, Subchapter A
of Chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 26 U. S. C. (1940), §
1400 et seq. The benefit features of each state's unemployment compensation system are
set forth in its own law on the subject, together with state taxing provisions. Federal
tax features relative to unemployment compensation are set forth in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Subchapter C of Chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, 26' U. S. C. ( I 940), § I 600 et seq.
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rights at stake. But it is also important to social security administration
in seeking to develop a coherent body of policy appropriate to the purposes of social security legislation.
Before embarking upon a discussion of the problem, it may be well
to remark that the social insurance system of the United States is
unique in that an individual's rights to benefits is defined basically in
terms of his employment and wages. This feature distinguishes it
from comparable systems in practically all foreign countries. In the
latter, benefit rights are usually based upon the periodic contributions
paid by the workers participating in the system, .and eligibility for
benefits is based upon the aggregate or frequency of such contributions ..
Since the American system makes use of employment and wages
as the basic measure of an individual's social insurance rights, it is of
crucial importance that administration shocld have at its disposal a
completely develoP.ed concept of what are "employment" and
"wages." Of course, in the majority of instances, a determination can
be made prima facie upon a mere report of the facts. However, there
is a significant area of problems in which a simple statement of fact
does not lead to a self-evident determination, and administration must
call upon the lawyers and economists to assist in determining whether
an alleged wage payment shall be deemed "wages" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. One such problem is the back pay
awarded to a worker pursuant to a reinstatement order of the National
Labor Relations Board.4
Some idea of the material extent of the problem may be suggested
by the fact that during the three fiscal years ending June 30, 1941,
some 13,000 workers were reinstated in their jobs by reinstatement
orders of the National Labor Relations Board, receiving an aggregate
of $2,233,284 in back pay.5 In addition many states have their own
"little Wagner Acts" which operate similarly; the number of reinstatements under these state acts and the back pay awarded by them
has not been compiled. To the workers receiving them, the issue
whether back pay awards shall be deemed "wages" may directly influence the amount of their unemployment benefits or old-age insurance
benefits, or benefits to survivors in the event of a worker's premature
death. Sometimes the issue is crucial as to elegibility for any benefits
at all.
Under§ 1o(c)~ 49 Stat. L. 453 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 160 (c).
SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 17-18 (1942);
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1941); FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1940).
4

"5 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD,
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Present Status of the Problem

The question whether NLRB back pay should be deemed wages
received considerable attention from various administrative agencies
during the year 1939 and in the early part of 1940. The earliest
ruling· appears to be that of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which
in S. S. T. 359 6 declared that for purposes of tax liability:
"Payments made tq discharged employees of the M Company
upon their reinstatement pursuant to an order of the National
Labor Relations Board do not constitute wages within the meaning of titles VIII and IX ot the Social Security·Act." 7
Shortly thereafter the Social Security Board decided that it would not
regard such back pay as constituting "wages" for purposes of wage
credits and benefits under the old-age and survivors insurance system.
Decisions on this question were also issued by a number of state
unemployment compensation authorities. Their conclusions' are divided. Those which rule back pay is not "wages" generally follow
the reasoning of the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling, or simply
stand upon it as a precedent.8 Those which rule that back pay is
"wages" find arguments which to them are more forceful in reaching
the opposite conclusion or even take issue with the. reasoning of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. 9
·
In resume, the reasoning in the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling
may be stated as follows: Section 209(a) of the .Social Security Act
defines "wages" as "all remuneration for employment" and section
209 (b) .defines ct employment" as "any service, of whatever nature,
performed ... by an employee for the person employing him." The
bureau therefore finds that back pay cannot be deemed "wages" because ( 1) the employee has performed no services for which such
payments are made; (2) the employer has done all wit~in his power
to terminate ·the employment relationship, at least temporarily; (3)
the employee has no right to demand compensation; and ( 4) back
6 S. S. T. 359, 1939-1 INT. REv. BULL. 305 (headnote); SocIAL SECURITY
BoARD, UNEMPLOYMENT CoMPENSATION INTERPRETATION SERVICE, FEDERAL SERIES,
Supplement of April 15, 1939, pp. 23-25.
7 49 Stat. L. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S. C. (1940), § 401 et seq.
8 E.g., California and Iowa. Cf. 4 SocIAL SECURITY BOARD, UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION INTERPRETATION SERVICE, STATE SERIES, No. 2, 2289 - . Iowa I 36;
also, California Department of Employment, Codified Interpretative Opinion, Code
No. 5011-47.
P E.g., New York and New Jersey; see discussion following.
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pay is payment to the employee on account of unemployment caused
by an unfair labor practice of the employer.
Other administrative agencies, which have ruled that back pay
is not "wages," have added the following arguments to support this
conclusion: ( r) that back pay is a "requirement imposed for violation
of the statute"; ( 2) that the definition of "employee" contained in
the Wagner Act is peculiar to that act; and (3) that the payment is
not remuneration for employment but rather results from th_e power
granted to the National Labor Relations Board in order to promote
better relations between employers and employees.
The opposite conclusion, holding that back pay is "wages," was
reached by certain of the unemployment compensation authorities. Of
particular interest is the reasoning in leading cases in New York and
New Jersey. The New York Appeal Board in July r939 reviewed
a claim for unemployment insurance benefits which had originally
been disillowed. Its decision,1° which was afterwards affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals,11 is founded upon the "make whole"
policy of the National Labor· Relations Act, and reads in part as follows:
"Under the provisions of the consent decree the appellant was
directed to 'make whole' the claimants for losses of pay sustained
by reason of their discharge. The amounts awarded to each of
the claimants for the year r937 under the terms of the con:sent
decree were computed upon their estimated earnings for that year
and were intended to recompense them for the wages they would
have earned had they not been wrongfully discharged. In the
light of this can it be said that the amounts so awarded were in
the nature of damages rather than wages? We believe not. To
do so would be to negative the very basis upon which these awards
were determined, and to deprive the employee of the benefits
granted to him under the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Law because of the wrongful act of the employer. The
only basis provided in the Unemployment Insurance Law for
the payment of benefits during periods of unemployment is wages
earned. Therefore, to consider as damages the amounts awarded
to these claimants would destroy their right to benefits based
thereon."
10

4

SocrAL SECURITY BoARD, UNEMPLOYMENT CoMPENSATION lNTERPRETAT--

2, 2301 - N. Y. R.
In re Tonra, 258 App. Div. 835, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 755 (1939).

TATioN SERVICE, STATE SERIES, No.
11
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The appeal board and the court therefore concluded that the back
pay should be added in to the total of wages for the computation of
the claimant's benefits.
When the New J etsey unemployment compensation agency first
considered the problem it ruled that back pay was damages rather than
wages/but in April I 940, it reheard the same case and reversed itself
on the ground that: (I) the National Labor Relations Board had determined that the discharge of the employee by the employer was
invalid; (2) that the claimant had remained in the employ of the employer during the period in question; (3) that he had held himself
ready throughout the period to perform services that might be assigned
him by the employer; and ( 4) that the payment in question was for
services rendered by the employee in holding himself ready to perform services assigned him by his employer.12
Thus a variety of legal doctrines have been looked to and have
been the basis of diametrically opposed conclusions. To gain orientation for re-examination of the problem, it may be valuable to review
briefly the statutory elements and the background of administrative
interpretation with respect to "wages" under the Social Security Act.
In the following discussion, only the old-age and survivors insurance
system will be treated for descriptive purposes; the content of the
various state administered unemployment compensation laws on the
points under discussion is quite similar, and the problems almost identical.
2.

Statutory Definition of "Wages''

Section 209 (a) of the Social Security Act reads: .
"The term 'wages' means all remuneration for employment,
including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium
other than cash; except that such term shall not include...."
Then follows a listing of kinds and types of payments which an employer 'might make to or in behalf of his employee and.which the Social
Security Act will not deem "wages." This listing includes remuneration in excess of $3,000 per calendar year; benefits under certain
types of private plans to meet an employee's expenses of sickness, accident, death or retirement; social security tax payments; dismissal wages
12

4

SocIAL SECURITY BOARD, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION lNTERPRETATIOK

SERVICE, STATE SERIES,

No. 2, 2298 - N.

J.
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under certain conditions; and any remuneration paid prior to the year
1937, when the act first went into effect.13
Since the term "wages" is identified as "remuneration for employment," it is essential to examine also the definition of "employment"
in order to complete the concept. Section 209 (b) of the act states that:
"The term 'employment' means . . . any service, of whatever
nature, performed . . . by an employee for the person employing him . . . except. . . ."
Then follows a list of fifteen exceptions of types of employment or
services which are not deemed "employment" for purposes of the Social Security Act. Some of these exceptions are based upon the nature
of the occupation, some are based upon the family relationship of the
employer to the employee, some are based upon the legal character of
the employer.14
While the statute thus defines "employment" and "wages," it must
be recognized that the determination of what constitutes employment
and wages does not purport to be an objective of the program. Quite
otherwise, the purpose of the legislation is "to provide for the general
welfare" and "to raise revenue," and, more specifically, the purpose of
the old-age and survivors insurance benefits program, title II, is that
of providing security for certain groups of the population, against the
economic hazards resulting from old age and death. 15 To carry out
these purposes, the statute outlines, broadly, certain administrative
methodology. It is in this area that "wages" determinations function.

3. Function of "Wages'' Determinations
''Wages" determinations fulfill a four-fold function:: (I) to determine which individuals shall be deemed eligible for benefits; (2)
to compute the amount of the benefit payable in each case; (3) to
13 Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. (1940), § 409(a); "wages" is defined in
identical language, for old-age and survivors insurance tax purposes, in the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U. S. C. (1940), § 1426(a). For purposes of interpretation, relating to the employee's tax and the employer's tax under the contributions act, there has been issued Treasury Regulations 106 ( 1940). Interpretations with
respect to benefits have been published as Social Security Regulations No: 3 (1940).
H.Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. (1940), § 409(b). Identical language appears
in the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S. C. (1940), § 1426(b). Identical
language also appears in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. (1940),
§ 1607(b) and {c).
15 Cf. Soc1AL SECURITY BOARD, WHAT 1s Soc1AL SECURITY? p. 9 (1940)
(pamphlet, I. S. C. 1).
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measure the tax or contribution assessment levied upon individuals for
purposes of financing the program; and (4) as a technique of control,
to prevent the enjoyment of benefits by those deemed not to be in
need of them. In explanation of this functional view:
(I) "Wages" determine if an individual shall be deemed eligible
for benefits, by virtue of the requirement that benefits shall be payable
to an individual only if he is-or is the close relative of-a "fully insured individual" or a "currently insured individual." To have "fully
insured" status, generally speaking, a worker must have a work history
showing at least $ 50 of wages paid in half as many calendar quarters
as have elaps~d b~tween January r, r937, and the time of his death
or attainment of age 65. 10 To have "currently insured" status, the
worker must have a recent work history showing at least $50 of wages
received for employment in at least six of the twelve calendar quarters
immediately preceding the quarter in which he died.11
(2) "Wages" determine the amount of benefits payable by serving
as the, basis of computations. A series of formulae are set forth in
the statute, the basic one being for determining a worker's "average
monthly wag~." Generally speaking, this average is found by dividing
the worker's aggregate wages, paid to him while in covered employment, by the •number of months which have elapsed after January I,
r937.18 If any substantial wage payment is omitted.from the wages
credited to a worker the average will be reduced, and benefit amounts
computed on the basis of such average will be reduced.
(3) "Wages" are the measure of taxes assessed upon workers and
their employers. The tax is a stated percentage of the wages paid to
each worker; the employer pays an amount equal to that collected
from all his employees.19
( 4) "Wages" are a control device, in that the amount of one
month's benefit is deducted for each month in which a beneficiary
works for wages of $ I 5 9r more. 20
It will be observed that while taxes are geared to the aggregate
of "wages" paid to the individual, benefits are geared to his "average
Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. ( 1940 ), § 409(g).
Id.,§ 409(h).
18 Id., § 409(£). The formula for the retired worker's, or "primary insurance,"
benefit is set forth in § 409(e); formulae for other benefits appear in § 402 (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), and (g).
19 Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S. C. (1940), § 1400; and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. (1940), §§ 1600-16oi.
20-Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. (1940), § 403(d)(1).
16

11
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monthly wage." In principle, the system provides benefit amounts
for each individual roughly in proportion to the wage income he enjoyed from his own employment, or in the case of dependents and survivors, from the employment of a spouse, parent or child.21
This inference as to principle seems to be confirmed, not only by
reports of the Congressional committees, but also by the general context of the statute. For example, section 209(a) states that "wages"
means not only remuneration in cash, but also the "cash value of all
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash," so that workers
receiving wages in kind shall not be at a disadvantage. Further, the
statute dismisses from its purview those workers who ordinarily receive earnings which in amount or frequency are not likely to bring
them within the requirements of eligibility for benefits. The earnings
of such workers are specifically excluded from consideration and taxation by the definition of "wages." The group thus excluded comprises college students, newsboys, spare-time officials of fraternal and
labor organizations who receive nominal remuneration, and workers
who do casual labor not in the course of the employer's business.22

4. Interpretation of Term "Wages''
As would be expected, day-to-day operations have required application of the statutory definitions to a wide variety of specific situations
which do not fit in an obvious manner into or outside the category of
"wages." The Social Security Board is required to make interpretations with r~pect to situations which arise under the old-age and survivors insurance program, and state unemployment compensation
agencies must make decisions on situations which relate to their systems. In addition, the Bureau of Internal Revenue makes decisions
on situations which arise under both types of program on questions of
tax liability.23 A large body of regulations, rulings, interpretations
21 Cf. S. REP. 734, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939), p. 10: "An average wage
formula ~ill relate benefits more closely to normal wages during productive years.
Since the object of social insurance is to compensate for wage loss, it is imper,ltive
that benefits be reasonably related to the wages of the individual." Also: "The monthly
benefits payable to these survivors are related in size to the deceased individual's past
monthly benefit or the monthly benefit he would have received on attaining age 65."
Id. I I. Similar statements appear in the companion report of the House Ways and
Means Committee. H. REP. 728, 76th Cong. 1st sess. (1939).
22 'S. REP. 734, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939), p. 19.
23 ln addition to general regulations published by the Social Security Board
(Regulations No. 3) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Regulations No. 106 and
107), the latter has issued numerous precedent rulings, published as the "S. S. T.
Series." Precedent rulings of the Social Security Board have to date not been published.
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and decisions has already grown up and will continue to increase.
Experience has led to the evolution of a technique of attack on this
whole class of problems, and although it has never been crystallized or
reduced to writing, it can be used as a framework for th'e soluti_sm of
the back pay problem. The technique is a process of examining any
payment alleged to be "wages," and of seeking to identify three elements in it:

(I) An employer-employee relationship;
( 2) Receipt of payment by the employee from the employer,
in the form of cash or something other than cash; and
(3) Services by the employee for the employer.24
For the vast majority of wage and salary payments, crediting as
"wages" is an automatic procedure. Ordinarily, payments are reported
quarterly by the employer to the tax collection agency, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, on a prescribed form, accompanied by transmission
of sufficient funds to cover both the employer's and all his employees'
taxes. The employer is authorized to withhold from each employee's
pay envelope the amount of the tax assessed against the employee's
wages. The report forms, identifying each employee, and listing the
amount of wages paid during the calendar quarter to each, is forwarded
to the Social Security Board.25 The board transfers each quarterly
wage item to a ledger account maintained for each employee, thus automatically crediting the reported payment as "wages." 26 This procedure has the effect of an administrative determination that the reported items are "wages" in the large majority of instances. There
are additional procedures whereby the Social Security Board may challenge the inclusion. of particular reported items, and other procedures
whereby a worker may make representations that he received certain
payments that were not reported but which should be credited to his
ledger account as "wages." 27
Ordinarily, then, the three elements which are· required for a determination of "wages" are presumed to exist prima facie upon an
employer's report that they were paid. However, supporting evidence
may be required whenever the Social Security Board considers it necesCf. Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. (1940), § 409(b).
Cf. SocIAL SECURITY BoARD, OuTLINE oF EMPLOYER'S DUTIES 5ff. (-1939)
(I. S. C. 30).
.
24

25

26

Cf.

Soc1AL SECURITY BoARD, A

HANDBOOK ON

2, 3 (1941).
27 Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. (1940), § 405.

SURVIVORS INSURANCE

FEDERAL OLn-AGE AND
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sary to question the recording of an alleged payment as "wages," or
the worker may offer evidence on one or more of these elements in
support of an allegation that more "wages" were received by him than
are entered on his wage record.
·
Note, however, that the board does not take account of wages
earned but not paid. The statute uses the term paid to the individual,
and this has been strictly construed to mean the physical transfer of
money or other remuneration. A limited exception to this rule has
been formulated to allow the crediting of wages constructively paid,
that is, retained by the employer but in a separate account and under
conditions which permit the employee to take possession of the money
upon demand and without restriction.28
Note, similarly, that the board does not concern itself with the
wage rate or the value of the services in relation to the amount of the
wage reported. For example, if an employer violates the Fair Labor
Standards Act and pays his employee below the minimum rate established by law, the board will credit to the employee's wage record only
those amounts actually paid to him. If, however, an action is instituted which results in an award to the employee of the difference
between the wages paid and the legal minimum, the board will credit
the amount awarded to the' employee's wage record as soon as payment is made. In other words, the board does not look behind the
wage payment as reported, being satisfied with the :finding that the
employer made an actual payment, that the payment related to "services," and that there was an employer-employee relationship.
With these considerations in mind, the NLRB back pay question
can be examined in the light of the three elements enumerated above.

(a) Employer-Employee Relationship
It is a firmly established principle that a reinstatement order of the
National Labor Relations Board operates retrospectively; it ordinarily
re-establishes the employee's status as of the beginning of the unfair
labor practice.29 With respect to the employment relationship, this
means that the employee is as if he had never been separated from his
employment; he regains whatever seniority rights, pension or other
rights he would have had but for the employer's illegal act in discharging him. Furthermore, the existence of the employment relationSocial Security Board, Regulations No. 3, § 403.801 (m).
Cf. Agwilines v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) 87
F. (2d) 146.
28

29
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ship is deemed to have been continuous during the entire period designated in the reinstatement order. This is brought out in the opinion
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on a Republic Steel
case. In this case, the jssue was as to vacation rights of certain employees
previously .reinstated upon order of the National Labor Relations
Board. The company had a vacation plan under which a set number
of days of vacation with pay were given to employees who had a
requisite number of years of continuous service.
· The company contended that the reinstated employees must start
as new employees in their accumulation of service credits to entitle them
to vacation under the plan. The opinion of the court on this question
reads in part as follows:
"The striking employees were ordered by the Board and by
this court to be reinstated 'without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights or privileges.' We think it was the intention of 'the
Board, as it was of this court, to provide that upon reinstatement
the striking employees were to be treated in all matters involving
seniority and continuity of employment as though they had not
been absent from work. It follows that the reinstated strikers are
entitled to the benefits of Republic's vacation plan for the year in
which they are reinstated and all subsequent years upon a basis of
continuity of service computed as though they had been actually
at work during the entire period from May 25, 1937 to the date
of reinstatement. Thus an employee who had continuous service
with Republic for twelve years prior to May 1, 1937 and who went
out on strike in that month and was reinstated in January, 1940,
would be entitled in 1940 to the vacation of IO days granted by
the vacation plan to employees having 15 years continuous
service." 30
·
It seems clear that an employee who is awarded back. pay together
with reinstatement must be deemed to have been in an employment
relationship with his employer during the period between discharge
and reinstatement.
(b) Payment
According to section IO( c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
board may in its discretion otder the employer to give the employee
back pay for the period since his discharge. However, this discretion is
limited, since in computing the amount of the back pay the board takes
30 Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 3d, 1940)
II4 F. (2d) 820 at 821 (italics supplied).
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into account such elements as customary wage rates, the customary
continuity and amount of employment the individual would have had,
and any factors which would have reduced his total earnings had the
normal situation not been interrupted, such as payless vacations and
work for other employers. In other words, the board takes into account
precisely those factors which would under normal circumstances have
determined the amount of wages the employee would have earned in
the course of the restored employment relationship.81
However, the fact that the amount of the payment is computed
in the manner of wages does not nec;:essarily imply that the payment
is wages. The ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for example,
contains language which seems to imply that the payment is a type
of damages when it says that these are "payments to the employees on
account of unemployment caused by an unfair labor practice of the
employer." 82
Reference might also be made to the 1937 Jones & Laughlin case
before the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for the
Court in this case has a sentence which might be interpreted as meaning
that back pay is inferred to be a type of penalty: "Reinstatement of the
employee and payment for time lost are requirements imposed for
violation of the statute and are remedies appropriate to its enforcement." 83
However more recent cases have given specific consideration to the
problem of the status of back pay. The "damages theory" seems to
have been ruled out by the decision in Agwilines v. National Labor
Relations Board. 84 The court was asked to pass upon the question
whether a back pay award constituted an award of damages without a
jury trial, and stated in part:
". . . The procedure the statute outlines is not designed to
award, the orders it authorizes do not award, damages as such.
. . . A cease and desist order operating retrospectively is not a
private award, operating by way of penalty or of damages." 35
As to whether or not a back pay award might be construed to be a
penalty, the Supreme Court decision in the Republic Steel Corporation
case seems to have ruled upon this point. This was the case in which
31

E.g., Matter of Atlas Mills, 3 N. L. R. B. 10 at 23 (1937).
S. S. T. 359, 1939-1 INT. REv. BULL. 305 at 307.
83
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
at 48-49, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
H (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) 87 F. (2d) 146.
85
Id. l 50, l 5 I.
82
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the discharged employees had obtained employment on a government
work-relief project while waiting for reinstatement. The Labor Board,
in order to prevent the employer from gaining the advantage of not having to make back payments in the amount that the employees had
earned on work-relief projects, ordered the corporation to pay to the
government work-relief agencies an amount equal to the work-relief
wages of the reinstated employees. The Court ruled this to be illegal.
In its majority decision ~he Court stated:
"The payments to the Federal, State, County, or other governments are thus conceived [by the labor board order] as being
required for the purpose of redressing, not an injury to the employees, but an injury to the public.... So conceived, these required payments are in the nature of penalties imposed by law
upon the employer,-the Board acting as the legislative agency in
providing ~hat sort of sanction by reason of public interest. We
need not pause to pursue the application of this theory of the
Board's power to a variety of circumstances where community interests might be asserted. The question is,-Has Congress conferred the power upon the Board to impose such requirements.
''We think that the theory advanced by the Board proceeds
upon a misconception of the National Labor Relations Act. The
act is essentially,remedial. It does not carry a penal program declaring the described unfair labor practices to be crimes. The act
does not prescribe penalties or fines in vindication of public rights
or provide indemnity against community losses as distinguished
from the protection and compensation of employees. Had Congress
been intent upon such a program we cannot doubt that Congress
would have expressed its intent and would itself have defined its
retributive scheme." 86
·
These decisions seem to set aside the thought that NLRB back pay
can be construed- as either damages or a penalty. Inevitably, it seems,
the payment must be related back to the employment and the employment contract which the employer had unsuccessfully attempted to interrupt by dismissal.
(c) Services
The third element in the characterization of "wages" is that which
relates it to "services" by the employee for the employer. In the ordinary sense of the term it is obvious that an employee cannot have performed any, useful work for his employer during _the perio~ of his
86 Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 7 at 9-10,
61 S. Ct. 77 (1940) (italics supplied).
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discharge, whether or not such discharge were legal. Common observation is the strongest argument against finding that the worker performed "services." One can only ask if services may properly be construed for the period covered by the back pay.
It has been noted above that a theory of "constructive services"
served as a basis upon which the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Commission Board of Review ruled back pay to be "wages." This
body declared that payment was in consideration of services rendered
by the worker in "holding himself ready" to perform services assigned
him by the employer.
There is an old "constructive service" doctrine in English law,
dating back to the early nineteenth century. It has been adopted by
the courts of a number of American jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions
have enacted statutes which recognize or restate it. On the other hand,
later English decisions have repudiated the doctrine, and in the majority of American jurisdictions the courts which have passed upon the
question have also definitely rejected or repudiated it. This doctrine
contemplates situations in which an employee, under a contract of employment for a specific term, is dismissed by his employer without sufficient cause. Those who uphold the doctrine maintain that by holding
himself ready and willing to perform the service contracted for, the
employee should be regarded in law as having actually performed the
services, and that he may therefore recover the compensation agreed
upon in the contract of employment. Those who reject the doctrine do
so on the ground that it is irrecon~ilable with the rule that a person
discharged from service must not remain idle but must accept employment elsewhere if offered. 87
Without attempting further inquiry into the constructive service
doctrine, it may be observed that the situations covered by this doctrine
are distinguishable from situations in which. the dismissal of an employee is declared an unfair -labor practice under the Wagner Act. In
the former type of situation, the employer has succeeded in his intent
to terminate the contract of employment' by dismissing his employee,
whereas in the latter, the discharge is deemed to be without effect;
and since reinstatement is made retrospectively, the employment relationship is deemed to have been continuously in operation throughout
the period following attempted discharge.
This seems to have been the thought in the recent decision by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the Hamilton-
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Brown Shoe Company case. A back pay order had been issued against the
company, but before the order was complied with, the company went
bankrupt, and the question before the court was whether the back pay
order constituted a prior claim against the assets of the company. Under
bankruptcy law, wages earned by the company's employees would
ordinarily be considered as entitled to a priority. The court ruled that
NLRB back pay is wages whose status is exactly the same as unpaid
wages earned by other employees in the normal course of the employer's operation. The court's decision reads in part:
"We have declared above that a back pay allowance, under
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, is intended as,
and constitutes, wages which a workman has constructively earned
by reason of his continued status as an employee. This view clearly
brings it within the operation of § 64a(2), II U. S. C. A. §
rn4a(2), governing wage priorities. If the act had authorized
such an allowance to be made in the nature of damages, a di:fferent
situation would perhaps be presented. Congress has, however,
specifically made it 'back pay' in a continued employment status
and this sufficiently constitutes it 'wages earned' to eliminate legal
shadows." 38
It may be urged in opposition to this thought that the Social
Security Act has adopted a usage of the term "services" which is peculiar
to itself. It may be argued that the use of the term "services" coupled
with the term "employment" is a statutory directive implying that more
than a mere contract of employment was contemplated. If this extreme
view were accepted, it would place ·upon the Social Security Board an
administrative burden unique in character and far flung in its i~plications. At any rate, this view has not been _advanced and need not detain
us.
That actual physical or mental labor is immaterial for a finding
that "services" were performed, seems to be a well established principle. In Re B. H. Gladding Co. 39 the federal district court was asked to
determine whether an employee had a valid priority claim for wages
with respect to a v3:cation with pay under a plan established by the
employer. The employee took the full vacation, but before he could obtain the pay, the employer went into bankruptcy and the referee in
bankruptcy disallowed the claim, on the ground that the bankruptcy
38 National Labor Relations Board v. Killoren, (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 122 F.
(2d) 609 at 614 (italics supplied).
39 (D. C. R. I. 1903) 120 F. 709.
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statute provided priority for wages earned and in this case the alleged
wages had not been earned. The court contradicted the referee's determination and stated in part:
"· .. To attempt distinctions between wages due which are
earned and wages due which are not earned, by an inquiry into the
amount of work done by the wage earner, would be entirely impractical. If we disallow claims for a week's vacation, we must also
disallow claims for half days when stores are closed, and for
days and hours when there is nothing to do. Wages are 'earned,'
in the sense in which that term is used in the bankruptcy act, so
long as a bona fide contract of hiring exists, and the clerk or servant continues in the master's employment and does all that he is
required to do. The practice of giving vacations with continued
pay is very general in all departments of business. Vacation wages
cannot be regarded as a mere gratuity, given in recognition of past
or present services. By continuing the relation of employer and
employee during a dull season, the employer holds his working
force in readiness for the active season. The relation of the employer and employed is as strictly a business relation as it is during
the working season, and there is full legal consideration for the
master's promise to pay wages during this period." 40
The social security statute itself clearly departs from any principle
that a showing of services in the form of actual physical or mental labor
must be made. The following types of payments have been deemed to
be "wages" although they arise in situations in which actual labor has
obviously not been performed: 41
(a) Vacation pay;
(b) Sick pay, disability pay, medical and hospital expenses, when
such payments are not a part of an established plan;
(c) Pay while on state National Guard duty; 42
( d) Retainer fees to consultants, etc.

5. Towards a Solution of the Problem
Thus, in spite of the uncertain status of the question as it has been
handled by various administrative agencies, there seems to be a weight
of argument in favor of ruling that NLRB back pay is "wages" within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. But more than this, the effect
40

Id. 7II.

41

Cf. Social Security Board, Regulations No. 3, § 403.827.

42 SocIAL SECURITY BoARD, UNEMPLOYMENT CoMPENSATION INTERPRETATION
SERVICE, FEDERAL SERIES,

1937, 47

s. s. T.
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of an affirmative ruling would seem to be in conformity with national
labor and social policy as reflected in the two statutes set side by side.
One of the stated purposes of the Wagner Act is that of removing
labor strife from among the causes of interruption of industrial opera- tion. There seems to be a warranted inference from this and other legislation that national labor policy also favors the stability of employment
and the continuity of workers' wag~ incomes. This inference reasonably
includes all elements of economic security incidental to uninterrupted
employment, as well as immediate remedies under the Wagner Act.
It seems clear that the "make whole" doctrine attributed to the National
Labor Relations Act easily includes the security for the worker and his
family which was created under the Social Security Act.
As previously stated, it is a fundamental principle of the old-age
and survivors insurance system that the individual's right to benefits is
established if he exhibits a specified regularity of wage income in an
industry which is covered by the law; and that the amount of those
benefits are a certain proportion of his average wage income during the
period which the system takes into consideration. The spouse or children or parents of a worker may enjoy similar rights by derivation from
the worker who has himself established entitlement. The function of
"wages" is thus conceived as a convenient device for measuring the
wage history by which an individual worker shall have· his right to
benefits determined, and by which the amount to which he is entitled
shall be computed.
A back pay award may be considered a reflection of the worker's
normal wage history for the period of illegal discharge, and as such
should be taken into account in measuring his social security benefit
rights. To do otherwise results in allowing principles of the Social
Security Act to be thwartea by an employer's illegal act. It is precisely
against the e:ffects of such acts that national labor and social legislation
has been created for the protection of the worker and his family.

